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Recent Decisions
CREDITOR'S RIGHTS - GUARANTY - DISCHARGE
OF GUARANTOR
Mutual Finance Co. v. Politzer, 16 Ohio App.
2d 83, 241 N.E.2d 906 (1968).
The confusing distinction between surety and guarantor1 has
been utilized by courts as a foundation for decision-making without
sufficient attention being paid to the close similarity between the
1 This distinction is best understood by first examining the difference between the
contract of the principal and that of the surety or guarantor. The principal makes a
contract in which he receives a benefit from and incurs an obligation to the other party,
the creditor. Thus, there are two parties to the contract and the principal has the burden
of discharging the obligation to the creditor. However, in order to provide security
for the creditor, an accessorial agreement may be made. This agreement is made for the
creditor's benefit by a third party, the surety or guarantor, acting on behalf of the
principal. It gives the creditor an additional person toward whom to look for ultimate
performance of the principal's obligation. However, as between the principal and the
accessorially bound third party, the principal should pay. If he does pay and the third
party must discharge the principal's obligation, the principal becomes obligated to him.
The distinction between surety and guarantor depends upon the nature of the acces-
sorial agreement. The surety's agreement is usually made contemporaneously with the
principal's contract and becomes a part of it. Thus, the surety is said to be primarily
liable with the principal. The liability of both surety and principal originates at the same
time. In contrast, the guarantor characteristically makes his separate contract at a time
different from that of the principal's contract. The guarantor's agreement does not ren-
der him liable until the principal defaults. Thus, the guarantor is said to be secondarily
liable. Consequently, while the creditor must sue principal and guarantor separately, the
surety and principal may be joined in the same action.
A further dimension of the guarantor's contractual liability is the distinction among
guarantors. The guarantor may be either absolute and unconditional or merely condi-
tional. The former is a guarantor of payment; the latter is a guarantor of collection.
The guarantor of payment agrees to pay if the principal does not, and he becomes liable
to the creditor immediately upon the principal's default. On the other hand, the guaran-
tor of collection agrees to pay only if payment cannot be judicially extracted from the
recalcitrant principal debtor. See Arnold, Primary and Secondary Obligations, 74 U.
PA. L. REv. 36 (1925).
The ancillary nature of the surety's and guarantor's contracts makes them appear very
much the same. The practical difference existing between them is that while the surety's
liability is unconditional, the guarantor's liability is conditioned upon default by the prin-
cipal and may be further conditioned upon the creditor's judicial attempt to collect from
the principal. Apart from the rather technical differences noted above, the two security
arrangements are indistinguishable, a fact attested to by the unitary treatment accorded
them by the RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 82 & comment g at 231 (1941). Addition-
ally, the distinction generally made between them has been deplored by most commenta-
tors. E.g., Peters, Suretyship Under Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 77
YALE L.J. 833, 841 & n.41 (1968). For further discussion of the distinction, see L.
SimPSON, SuRETYSIP § 14, at 16-23 (1950); A STEARNS, StJRETYsIP § 1.5 (5th ed.
1951); 10 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1211 (3d ed. 1967); Cormack & McCarroll,
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two. 2 The technical difference between them, even though each
serves essentially the same function, 3 occasionally gives rise to dif-
ferent allocations of legal rights and remedies.4 Ohio courts have
long recognized and placed great weight upon the distinction.5 At
times it can be a useful tool with which to measure the liability as-
sumed by the respective parties when analysis of the terms of an
agreement proves useless.6 However, when the equitable principles
associated with suretyship are disregarded as a result of the empha-
visions, 10 S. CAL. L REV. 371 (1937); Green, Distinction Between Suretyship and
Guaranty in Georgia, 9 GA. BJ. 273 (1947).
2 See Radin, Guaranty and Suretyship, 18 CALIF. L REv. 21, 29-30 (1929); 24 GA.
BJ. 273 (1962).
3 The function of either a surety or a guarantor is to answer for "the debt, default or
miscarriages" of another person by contract. Downs, A Surety's Basic Rights and Rem-
edies, 15 DEFEN E LJ. 139 (1966).
4 The difference in the allocation of rights is well illustrated by the means available to
guarantors and sureties for protecting themselves from loss through liability to a creditor.
A surety may recover from the principal debtor by way of subrogation or by the equitable
doctrine of reimbursement. A guarantor appears to have only subrogation rights.
Compare 50 Am. JUR. Suretyship § 221 (1944), with 30 AM. JUR. 2D Guaranty § 127
(1968). This seems to be the trend in Ohio. Compare 50 OHIo JUR. 2D Suretyship §§
144, 145 (1961), with 26 OHIo JuRL 2D Guaranty § 40 (1957). In Ohio a surety
does have both means of recovery available to him. See Seward v. National Surety Co.,
.120- Ohio'SL. 47, 165 N.E., 537 (1929) (subrogation); Elsea v. Pepple, 12 Ohio N.P.
(n.s.) 468 (C.P. 1912) (reimbursement). The question 'of the availability of reim-
bursement to Ohio guarantors has never been raised. The treatises indicate that the
answer would be negative. But see Barger v. Gething, 39 Ohio L. Abs. 221, 52 N.E.2d
94 (Ct. App. 1943). Other jurisdictions give the guarantor reimbursement rights. See
Dykes v. Clem Lumber Co., 58 Ariz. 176, 118 P.2d 454 (1941); Leslie v. Compton, 103
Kan.,92, 172 P. 1015 (1918). The RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 104 (1)(a) & com-
ment f .at 27.8 (194.1) suggests that a guarantor should have this right; however, in
Ohio thequestion is open, and a potential for different treatment for sureties and guar-
antors exists.
I An additional difference occurs in the application of statutory protection. The doc-
trine as announced in.Pain v. Packard, 13 Johns. 174 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1816) which allows
a surety to require the creditor to first proceed against the principal -ebtor has been codi-
fied in Ohio. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1341.04 (Page 1962). This statute has
been construed to-apply only to sureties. Galloway v. Barnesville Loan, Inc., 74 Ohio
App. 23, 57 N.E.2d 337 (1943). For other statutes which.are written in favor of sure-
ties and which seem to afford guarantors no relief, see OFHo REV. CODE ANN. §§
1341.19.,(exoneration), 1341.20 (indemnity prior to debt's maturity), § 1341.21 (pro-
visional remedies) (Page 1962).
5 See, e.g., Madison Nat'l Bank v. Weber, 117 Ohio St. 290; 158 N.E. 543 (1927).
For an example of the same distinction made in other jurisdictions, see Saint v. Wheeler
& Wilson Mfg. Co., 95 Ala. 362, 10 So. 539 (1892). Some states, however, reject the
distinction. Hamilton v. Meiks, 210 Ind. 610,4 N.B.2d 536 (1936) (the obligations of
guarantors and sureties differ, only slightly in a technical and insubstantial manner);
Brock v. State Bank & Trust Co., 187 La. 766, 175 So. 569 (1937) (contracts of guar-
anty and suretyship are the same); Plummer v. Wilson, 322 Pa. 118, 185 A. 311 (1936)
(a contract of guaranty is a contract of suretyship unless expressly stated otherwise).
6 See Lakemore Plaza, Inc. v. Shoenterprise Corp., 91 Ohio L. Abs. 140, 188 N.E.2d
203 (C.P. 1962).
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sis placed on the distinction, the result merely promotes confusion
as demonstrated by the recent case of Mutual Finance Co. v. Politzer.'
In Mutual, the Politzers executed absolute and unconditional
personal guaranties as security for a loan made by the finance com-
pany to their closely held corporation.' The loan was also secured
by a chattel mortgage executed by the corporation to the finance
company. Upon default by the corporation, the finance company
seized the mortgaged chattels and sold them without complying with
the notice requirements of section 1319.07 of the Ohio Revised
Code. The sale, however, left a deficiency remaining on the cor-
poration's debt, and the finance company sued the Politzers on their
guaranties in an attempt to collect the deficiency. At trial the Polit-
zers successfully argued that the finance company's failure to com-
ply with section 1319.07 barred it from collecting the deficiency
from the principal debtor, the corporation, and therefore they, as
guarantors, were also relieved of any liability. The Court of Ap-
peals for Cuyahoga County reversed on the grounds that the single
purpose of the statute's notice requirement is to enable a mortgagor
to protect his equity interest in his chattels and that this protection
does not inure to the benefit of any person not a party to the mort-
gage. 10
The court's interpretation of the purpose of the statute's notice
7 16 Ohio App. 2d 83, 241 N.E.2d 906 (1968).
8 The Politzers, a husband, his wife, and his mother, had individually executed the
guaranties on behalf of the corporation because the husband was the sole shareholder.
The loan constituted the financing for the corporation's inventory which consisted of
used cars. These cars were the subject of a chattel mortgage executed as additional se-
curity for the loan. Since the guarantors represented the total ownership interest in the
corporation, it is difficult to separate the identities of the Politzers from that of the cor-
poration. This may, in part, account for the court's attitude toward the guarantors' lia-
bility to pay the corporation's debt.
9 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1319.07 (Page 1962) [hereinafter cited as § 1319.07)
provides in part that any chattel mortgagee who, before foreclosure, takes property cov-
ered by the chattel mortgage out of possession of the mortgagor and sells or otherwise
disposes of it may not collect any deficiency on the mortgage from the mortgagor or his
successors in interest. The effect of the statute may be avoided by giving the mortgagor
written notice stating the date and time of sale and the minimum acceptable price tor
the chattel. This notice must reach the mortgagor 10 days prior to the sale. At any time
prior to the time of the sale stated in the notice the mortgagor may redeem his property
by paying the mortgagee the amount due and unpaid on the obligation secured by the
mortgage.
10 The Politzers conceded that as guarantors they were not entitled to receive statutory
notice of the sale. It was their position that the corporation was relieved of its obligation
secured by the mortgage because of the finance company's failure to give requisite no-
tice. Hence, the effect of discharge of the principal was the central thrust of the Polit-
zers' argument. Brief for Appellee at 4, 6, Mutual Fin. Co. v. Politzer, 16 Ohio App. 2d
83, 241 N.E.2d 906 (1968).
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requirement accords with prior decisions.11 The benefits of the stat-
ute by its plain meaning 2 and by judicial interpretation 3 are
intended to flow to the mortgagor or his successors in interest. To
this end the Ohio courts have required strict compliance with the
time limit of 10 days prior to which notice must be received. 14 In
addition, the obligation of the mortgagee to notify is not affected by
voluntary surrender of the chattels to -him by the mortgagor.15 The
Politzers were not mortgagors of the chattels sold and thus were
not entitled to notice prior to the sale of the chattels. However, the
corporation, being the principal debtor and mortgagor, was within
the statute's protection, and the lack of notice prior to sale served to
prevent the finance company from collecting any deficiency remain-
ing on the debt from the corporation. The question before the
court was whether the statute's bar to an action by the finance
company against the principal debtor had any effect on the lia-
bility of the party secondarily liable, the Politzers.'6
Prior to Mutual the statute had been raised as a defense by per-
sons other than a mortgagor. In Economy Savings & Loan Co. v.
Weir,17 the accommodation maker of a promissory note was sued for
a deficiency remaining after the creditor had sold the principal
debtor's chattel which had been mortgaged as security for the note.
The creditor had failed to give notice of the sale to either the prin-
11See Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Burkett, 176 Ohio St. 449, 200 N.E.2d 314 (1964).
Information concerning the sale enables the mortgagor to purchase the chattel himself
or decrease the possibility of a deficiency by bidding up the price.
12See § 1319.07 which speaks of the mortgagor or his successor in interest in the
chattel being relieved of liability for a deficiency.
13 Economy Say. & Loan Co. v. Weir, 105 Ohio App. 531, 153 N.E.2d 155 (1957).
14 See, e.g., Associates Discount v. Barstow, 2 Ohio Misc. 73, 78, 205 N.E.2d 667
(Mun. Ct. 1964).
15 James Tolcott, Inc. v. Taylor Indus., Inc., 1 Ohio App. 2d 111, 198 N.E.2d 271
(1963).
16 See note 10 supra.
17 105 Ohio App. 531, 153 N.E.2d 155 (1957). Economy involved three parties.
C, the holder of the promissory note, had loaned money to D, the maker of the note and
C had required that D secure the transaction by a mortgage and by obtaining an accom-
modation maker. S was not party to the mortgage but signed the note as an accom-
modation maker. Thus the mortgage involved only C and D whereas the note involved
all three parties. It is noteworthy that S's plea when sued by C for the deficiency was
that C was required to notify S as well as D in order to be able to collect the deficiency.
In rejecting this contention the court observed that S was not involved in the mortgage
and had no interest in D's chattel. See also Modem Finance Co. v. Reynolds, 108 Ohio
App. 535, 161 N.E.2d 240 (1958), where the statute was raised by a defendant having
no interest in mortgaged chattels which had been sold without the required notice.
The court followed Economy on the issue of who could avail himself of the statute's pro-
tection, but never reached the question of the statute's effect on codebtors since the credi-
tor was not barred from proceeding against the mortgagor and codebtor of the defend-
ant.
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cipal debtor or the accommodation maker, and the latter argued that
he was discharged by virtue of the creditor's failure to notify him.
The court rejected this contention stating that section 1319.07 re-
quires that notice be given only to the mortgagor of the chattel.
However, it went on to point out that an accommodation maker
would be discharged as a result of the creditor's failure to give no-
tice because "It]he mortgagee ... thus divested itself of any and all
rights against the mortgagor to which the accommodation maker
could have otherwise become subrogated for reimbursement."' 18 That
is, an accommodation party essentially serves as a surety for the party
accommodated.' 9 Thus the court recognized that while the bene-
fits of section 1319.07 do not directly inure to a party acting as a
surety for a mortgagor, release of the mortgagor would work a simi-
lar release of the accommodating party on general suretyship prin-
ciples. By implication -the Economy case indicates that individuals
subject to the requirements of the statute may not fail to give the re-
quired notice and expect to recover against the mortgagor's surety.
This implication suggests that a guarantor, whose right of subroga-
tion is as fragile as a surety's, should also be protected by the stat-
ute.2o
In making its decision the Mutual court placed primary empha-
sis on the sphere of the statute's protection rather than on the stat-
ute's effect. The court reasoned that since a guarantor is distin-
guishable from a surety, in that the former's position is weaker,2' the
statute's protective shield excluded guarantors as well. Satisfied that
the Politzers could not claim the benefit of the statute, the court
faced the issue of whether or not discharge of the principal because
18 The court approvingly noted the rule that discharge of the maker will also dis-
charge his accommodation maker. See OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1303.34 (Page 1954),
a.( amended, §§ 1303.67, .69, .71 (Page 1962). Unfortunately for S, his plea did not
include the affirmative defense of the effect of the statute and he could not raise it on
appeal. 105 Ohio App. 531, 153 N.E.2d 155 (1957). For further discussion of the de-
cision, see 10 W. RFS. L. REV. 433 (1959).
'9 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1303.51 & comment 1 (Page 1962).
20 This implication was not accepted by the Mutual court. For a discussion of possi-
ble reasons for this rejection, see notes 26 & 27 infra & accompanying text.
21 See Galloway v. Barnesville Loan, Inc., 74 Ohio App. 23, 57 N.E.2d 337 (1943).
The Galloway case pointed out that a surety is primarily liable with the principal debtor
whereas the guarantor's liability is only secondary. Apparently the surety's primary lia-
bility entitles him to protection which is unavailable to the guarantor because primary
liability is greater than secondary liability. This reasoning, however, seems to be faulty.
A better reason would be that the contract of a guarantor of payment specifically waives
the protection which section 1341.04 affords while the obligation of a guarantor of col-
lection specifically includes the same form of protection. Nevertheless this case was cited
by the Mutual court for the proposition that sureties are entitled to defenses to which
guarantors are not. For additional discussion of the distinction, see notes 1 & 4 supra.
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of the creditor's action similarly would discharge the Politzers as ab-
solute guarantors. In order to resolve this the court examined the
nature of an absolute guarantor's liability. Generally, this liability.
commences immediately upon maturity of the debt guaranteed; 22
consequently, the Politzers were liable at the moment the corporation
defaulted.23  Moreover since the finance company was under no ob-
ligation to seek collection from the corporation prior to proceeding
against these absolute guarantors, the finance company made no pre-
clusive election when it proceeded directly against the corporation.
Rather, because the abortive attempt to collect from the corporation
had no effect upon the guarantors' separate contractual obligations,
Mutual was simply capitalizing upon the in depth contractual pro-
tection with which it had secured its loan to the corporation.
The court rejected the Politzers' argument, based on Economy,
that since a surety is discharged when a creditor is prevented from
collecting a deficiency from the principal debtor because of the op-
eration of section 1319.07, a guarantor is likewise discharged. In
disposing of this contention the court emphasized the separateness
of the Politzers' agreement and that existing between the finance
company and the corporation. 4 The effect of the statute while pre-
cluding the finance company from proceeding against the corpora-
tion on the basis of the obligation secured by the mortgage did not
reach the separate guaranties. The specific grounds for -the court's
rejection of the Economy rationale are not clear.2" The court's em-
phasis on the fact that the Politzers' liability arose from a contrac-
tual agreement separate from the obligation of the corporation
whereas the surety's liability -in Economy was predicated on a prom-
issory note which was coextensive with the debtor's liability suggests
several possible readings of Economy by the Mutual court: (1) The
surety's liability in Economy was based solely on the note itself.
Once the creditor was barred by the statute's effect from collecting
the deficiency remaining on the note, the creditor's rights against
the surety were lost.26  (2) The surety possessing both rights of re-
22 Gould v. Gerkin, 28 Ohio App. 309, 315, 162 N.E. 701, 703 (1927). See also
note 1 supra.
2 3 See Castle v. Rickly, 44 Ohio St. 490, 497, 9 N.E. 136, 138 (1886).
24 16 Ohio App. 2d at 88-89, 241 N.E.2d at 912. The fact that a guaranty contract
is separate security or is on a separate instrument has served as a rationale for not allow-
ing the guarantor to assert the defenses of his principal. See Green, supra note 1, at 278.2
5See note 18 supra & accompanying text.
20This reasoning is suggested by the nature of section 1319.07. The statute specifi-
cally provides that the creditor is barred from collecting any deficiency remaining on the
mortgage or any obligation secured thereby. See note 9 supra. It could be argued that
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imbursement and subrogation would be able to recover from the
principal debtor after paying the creditor." Thus, in order to pre-
serve the statute's protection for the principal, the court discharged
the surety along with the principal.
Whichever reading of the Economy case was utilized by the Mu-
tual court, it rested its rejection of the Politzers' Economy argument
on the basis of the distinction between guarantors and sureties. Had
the Politzers been liable as sureties, their obligation to the finance
company would have been discharged by the statute's operation.
However, as guarantors, the Politzers could not claim that their
agreements were effected by the statute's operation.2 8  The Politzers
did not have the rights of sureties and the Mutual court refused to
discharge them, indicating that once the principal has defaulted, his
unconditional guarantor's liability to the creditor is indefensible.29
The reasoning of the court reflects a disregard for the general
the note was rendered worthless by the creditor's failure to give notice since it was se-
cured by the mortgage. Such a result would give the creditor no basis on which to pro-
ceed against the surety since his liability arose from the note itself.
27 See note 4 supra. The surety's right of subrogation would be barred by the stat-
ute's operation. However, the equitable right of reimbursement existing separate from
the subrogation right would allow the surety to recover from the principal the amount
paid the creditor. By allowing the creditor to recover the deficiency by going against
the surety and thereby exposing the principal to liability, the court would permit a fraud
to be worked on the principal. See Gholson v. Savin, 137 Ohio St. 551, 556, 31 N.E.2d
858, 861 (1941).
28 Apparently the question of a guarantor's right of reimbursement by indemnity re-
mains open in Ohio. See note 4 supra. However, the Mutual court accepted the finance
company's contention that a guarantor recovers only by way of subrogation. 16 Ohio
App. 2d at 91, 241 N.E.2d at 911. This contention was raised when the Politzers argued
that the stamte's purpose would be subverted if they were able to recover from the
corporation by way of reimbursement.
29 The conclusion follows from the court's reasoning that since the finance company
could sue the Politzers immediately after the corporation's default, no act by the finance
company toward the corporation could possibly affect the Politzers' liability. The reason-
ing suggests that once the guarantor's liability obtains, no act by the creditor subsequent
to the accrual of liability will affect that liability unless the creditor acts directly toward
the guarantor. Nevertheless, there are a number of theories from which a guarantor
might argue that he should be discharged by such a subsequent act. See Whalen v. Dev-
lin Lumber & Supply Corp., 251 Md. 51, 246 A.2d 247 (1968) (any act by the creditor
which increases the guarantor's risk or injures his rights will release the guarantor to the
extent of injury); Gholson v. Savin, 137 Ohio St. 551, 31 N.E.2d 858 (1941) (when the
creditor makes an absolute settlement with the principal debtor, releasing him from the
obligation, the debtor secondarily liable is discharged because there can be no subroga-
tion to the rights of the creditor against the principal for reimbursement, that right
having been extinguished by the settlement with and release of the principal debtor);
Procaccino v. Elberon Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 16 Ohio Misc. 182, 241 N.E.2d 758 (C.P.
1968) (failure of creditor to foreclose on security for debt after principal's default re-
leases guarantor); Arant, Why Release of Security Discharges a Surety, 14 MINN. L. REV.
725 (1930) (imprudent release of security by creditor releases secondarily liable party
pro tanto); 2 DE PAUL L. REV. 81 (1953) (failure of creditor to perfect a security in-
terest releases the guarantor).
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rule that the rights of a guarantor must not be prejudiced by the
creditor.30 In order to avoid a direct confrontation with this prin-
ciple the court distinguished between voluntary prejudice and preju-
dice which occurs by operation of law. The finance company had
not voluntarily released the corporation from its debt, but rather
was barred by operation of the statute from collecting the remain-
ing deficiency. Few Ohio cases have dealt with this exception;"1
and, the various rationales proffered by other jurisdictions may well
be inapplicable to the operation of section 1319.07.32 Unfortu-
nately the court did not inquire into any of the reasons why a release
of the principal by operation of law should not discharge a guaran-
tor, thus the court closed the question as to the alternatives that may
be available to relieve a guarantor of liability.3
In effect, Mutual relieves creditors from complying with the re-
quirements of section 1319.07 when selling repossessed or seized
chattels so long as there is an unconditional guarantor of the debt.
Although the Ohio case law requires strict compliance with this stat-
ute if the mortgagee expects to collect any deficiency resulting from
a sale of such chattels, Mutual shifts the risk of loss resulting from
noncompliance with the statute's notice requirements from the mort-
gagee to the unconditional guarantor. Thus, while commercial real-
ity suggests that lenders should be encouraged to make loans and be
3
oSee RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 122 & comment b (1941).
31 See Moore v. Gray, 26 Ohio St. 525 (1875) (statute of limitations). Compare
Central Nat'l Bank v. Mills, 62 Ohio App. 413, 427, 24 N.E.2d 607, 614 (1939), with
Merrit v. Pritchard, 4 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 571, 574-76 (C.P. 1906) (bankruptcy).
32The majority of jurisdictions refuse to allow a surety to be discharged when the
creditor's claim is barred by the statute of limitations. E.g., Auchampaugh v. Schmidt,
70 Iowa 642, 27 N.W. 805 (1886); see Annot., A.LR.2d 1272-73 (1958). How-
ever, the better view is that if the creditor does not proceed against the guarantor within
a reasonable time, his prejudice of the guarantor's right of subrogation discharges the
guarantor. REsTATEMENT OF SEcURITY § 130, comment g, at 354-55 (1941). See
also Mulvane v. Sedgley, 63 Kan. 105, 114, 64 P. 1038, 1041 (1901) (concurring opin-
ion); Arnold, The Statute of Limitations in the Law of Suretyship, 17 ILL. L. REV. 1
(1922).
The most often cited reason for not allowing the guarantor to raise the defense of
the statute of limitations is that the surety or guarantor is not released when the creditor
does not contribute to the release by his own positive act. Wagoner v. Watts, 44 N.J.L.
126 (Sup. Ct. 1882). The operation of section 1319.07 is analogous to the statute of
limitations since a deficiency barred by the statute is not extinguished; it is simply uncol-
lectable. However, rather than resulting from the creditor's failure to act, a debt made
unenforceable by section 1319.07 is a direct result of the creditor's positive act. The stat-
ute specifies how the mortgagee may protect his interests against the mortgagor - he
need only follow the statute's notice requirements.
33 For additional discussion of such principles, see Clark, Suretyship in the Uniform
Commercial Code, 46 TEXAs L REv. 453, 458-59 (1968); Peters, supra note 1, at 875
n.171; Note, The Availability of a Principal's Defense to His Uncompensated Surety, 46
YALE L.J. 833 (1937); Note, Liability of a Surety When the Principal Obligor is Un-
enforceable, 13 COLtM. L. REV. 426 (1913).
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afforded ample security in exchange for responsible treatment of the
rights of the parties providing such security, Mutual seems to dis-
courage this balance. 4
The guarantor of a debt which is also secured by a chattel mort-
gage can protect himself from the effects of Mutual by conditioning
his agreement on the mortgagee's compliance with the requirements
of section 1319.07."5 In addition, the mortgagor would do well to
request that his guarantor include such a condition in his contract.
In this way the mortgagee would be strongly encouraged to comply
with section 1319.07 and the problems raised in Mutual would be
obviated.31
Central to the court's decision is the distinction drawn in Ohio
between guarantors and sureties. This distinction enabled the court
to reach a decision contrary to the result which would have been re-
quired had the Politzers borne the label of surety. 7 This absurd
result is not supported by analysis of the essential differences be-
tween guarantors and sureties because these differences are less than
substantial. Certainly they do not justify the difference in judicial
attitude toward the two. 8 Therefore, a most unfortunate aspect of
the decision is the perpetuation of this awkward and undesirable
distinction. The court suggested that the legislature might protect
guarantors by specifically including them in the class of persons pro-
3 4 The result in Mutual gives the mortgagee as much security as he has ever been able
to obtain but relieves him of the obligation of protecting the mortgagor's right of re-
demption; Mutual places this loss upon the guarantor. Such a trend is wholly incon-
sistent with the traditional view that the guarantor or surety is a favored debtor. See
Magee v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 92 U.S. 93, 98 (1875). For an example of how this
situation could be handled more equitably, see Coast Fed. Say. & Loan v. Crawford, 117
F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1941). For a treatment of deficiency liability and notice of the sale
of seized chattels under the Uniform Commercial Code sections 9-504 (2). 9-507 (1), see
Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 222 F. Supp. 696, 702 (W.D. Pa. 1963).
, However, a realistic view of the negotiations which produce guaranties suggests
that the average person has no knowledge of the need to specifically condition his obliga-
tion on a mortgagee's compliance with section 1319.07.
360ne of the aspects of the case which seemed to trouble the court was that the Polit-
zers' argument was based on a technicality. Had the finance company complied with
the written notice requirement, the Politzers conceded that both they and the corporation
would have been liable on the debt. In addition, the identity of the Politzers being
so closely linked with the corporation undoubtedly led the court to conclude that since
they had incurred the debt, they should not be allowed to avoid paying it by means of
a technicality. This suggests a conflict within the court between the purpose of sec-
tion 1319.07 and the idea that all men should pay their debts. The court resolved the
conflict by stating that the statute's protection does not include guarantors.
37See notes 17-20 supra & accompanying text.
3sSee note 1 supra. The absolute guarantor is primarily liable upon default by his
principal in the same way that the surety is liable. Neither guarantor nor surety can be
sued prior to default; thus, the practical difference between their liability after default is
nonexistent.
